Abstract: The intersection of private rights and public responsibilities lies at the heart of both environmental and property law. This article considers this intersection in the context of debates about property ownership and notions of environmental stewardship. These form the background to considering shifts in water rights law in England and Wales and the extent to which they can be said to exhibit or exemplify a shift towards stewardship. Section 27 of the Water Act 2003 is analysed as this authorises revocation or variation of an abstraction licence without compensation in order to protect waters or aquatic flora and fauna from 'serious damage'. Because regulatory abstraction licensing is a modern overlay on the common law, but one which has protected many existing abstractors from restrictions on their rights, section 27 might be regarded as strongly indicative of a stewardship shift in water rights. However, I argue that greater attention needs to be paid to the wider context within which this provision operates before it can be deployed as an unambiguous prostewardship example. I suggest that a range of related regulatory, economic and interpretive factors are likely to lead, in practice, to limited direct legal intrusion on private water rights. The case of section 27 serves as a 'bottom up' example of a need for circumspection about whether any specific formal, doctrinal reform is likely to exemplify, or support, a shift towards stewardship in water or property law, and draws out some of the complex relations between public and private interests that characterise stewardship.
INTRODUCTION
The intersection of private rights and public responsibilities lies at the heart of both environmental and property law. Amongst numerous examples of conflict between the two, exposing students' to Hardin's 'The Tragedy of the Commons', 2 and to its theoretical and
Getzler. 10 Freyfogle's work, in particular, is notable for advocating wider environmental responsibilities.
1 ' Water rights, however, have featured hardly at all in the UK-based stewardship literature.
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OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH
This brief overview sets the context for the argument which is developed in this article. The reason for this is that the aim of this article is distinctly different from most contributions to the stewardship debate. Its ambition is to call for greater attention to the practical operation of legal reforms which appear to exemplify stewardship concerns. The objective is neither to test the stewardship thesis doctrinally nor directly, but to explore the operation of -in this case statutory -legal provisions which display stewardship qualities and to reach an assessment of the extent to which they may be used in the debate. The hope is that this may enrich our critical understanding of stewardship as an operative concept. Hence, while the workshop at which an earlier version of this article was presented aimed to 'rethink water rights through stewardship', this article tries, from a broadly socio-legal perspective, to rethink -or, perhaps more accurately, to reassessstewardship through a specific water rights example.
To be clear, then, my focus is not in contributing to certain important debates in property law in which the concept of stewardship has been prominent, for example (i) as between those who argue that'property' follows from bare legal entitlements 13 and those who stress that property is more a matter of gradation, dependent on determinations about resource allocation;C. M. Rose 'Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common Law Water Rights ' (1990) water law, it will increasingly exist as a collection of use-rights, rights defined in specific contexts and in terms of similar rights held by other people. Property use entitlements will be phrased in terms of responsibilities and accommodations rather than rights and autonomy. A property entitlement will acquire its bounds from the particular context of its use, and the entitlement holder will face the obligation to accommodate the interests of those affected by his water use. If I am right, property law future will be a version of water law present': ibid. at 1530-1; 'a water user is a steward of a certain water flow and has the responsibility to use that water in a way that produces socially desirable benefits': ibid. at 1543). 12 See above n. shorthand for a general conceptual orientation, the analysis inevitably explores tensions within ideas of stewardship and of property.
In terms of approach and sceptical orientation, perhaps the closest example is Mitchell's work on the so-called 'right to roam' over registered common land and open countryside, which was brought into law in England and Wales under the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, implemented by a process of mapping (under section 4(1)) which was completed in 2005. It might be said that regardless of the outcome of this process and of the specific rights afforded both to recreational users and to landowners, the opening up of certain land for public recreational access without payment of compensation was primarily evidence of a significant shift in how at least certain kinds of property fights are to be understood. However, while there is undoubtedly some truth in this, and this particular reform is widely cited as an example of a stewardship approach,1 6 there is also something in Mitchell's argument that a secondary consequence of this land access law reform is that in many ways it actually served to entrench certain aspects of landowner rights, and placed landowners in a stronger (public law) position relative to access users. The specific example used is the issue of restricting water fights in the interests of ecological water quality, driven in part by the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD). 18 Section 27 of the Water Act 2003, which came into force in 2012, enables, where the Secretary of State is satisfied that this is necessary, rights to be varied or restricted without compensation in order to protect waters or aquatic flora and fauna from 'serious damage'. Because regulatory abstraction licensing is a modern overlay on the common law, but one which has protected many existing abstractors from restrictions on their rights, section 27 might be regarded as strongly indicative of a stewardship shift in water rights, removing -for those who prefer the bundle of sticks approach -the stick marked 'right to cause serious aquatic ecological harm' from the bundle held by the water rights owner. 19 Unlike land access, however, the focus is community ecological obligations rather than duties owed to others. Section 27 addresses prevention of harm rather than more positively formulated stewardship responsibilities, and therefore might be seen as at the less contentious end of the stewardship spectrum, 20 and hence a particularly good example to take. In English law there is no right in water itself, and riparian rights are regarded as rights to land covered with water. 2 1 Hence, as discussed in more detail below, there is no common law right to receive any particular flow of surface water and, in the case of groundwaters, in theory at least, no right to receive even a reasonable flow. 22 Nor, however, is there any common law remedy for damaging the unowned environment, at least where ecological damage is not linked to a recognised property right.
STRUCTURE
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Responses to this are likely to vary. In terms of a private law response, some might see the solution as lying in reform of the law of tort, for example to allow claims, unconnected with property rights, on behalf of 'nature'. 24 For others, the consequence of this is a broader need to reorder property rights, justified by stewardship concerns. 25 Some go further and argue that nothing less than replacing private property with stewardship is called for. 26 For the most part, however, the legal response to environmental damage primarily comes not through reforming property law but through public, regulatory law. However, debates about property are relevant to public law reform (and vice versa). Ideas about property impact on what regulation may be able to achieve. These ideas shape our understandings of the relative importance to be attached to private rights and public responsibilities and shape the way in which this balance or calibration is undertaken, for example whether it is thought necessary, or preferable, to compensate owners for the loss of their rights, or otherwise what degree of respect and protection we feel the rights holder is entitled to.
Liberal or entitlement approaches typically focus on what are argued to be core rights (for example, of use, access and alienation) that are said to inhere in property. By contrast, stewardship approaches typically stress the extent to which outward-looking obligations inhere in private ownership. For some, the essence of a stewardship approach entails certain restrictions on land use (or access) in the wider public interest: essentially, a restraint model of stewardship. Others stress that stewardship also entails the owing to others or to the natural world of property law duties which may entail future-looking positive management obligations. 29 Even identifying a central core of what stewardship means, then, can be challenging. To reduce the meaning to one which stresses regard for others (and for the environment) makes for a very general core at the heart of what stewardship seems to entail. However, for present purposes it is sufficient to identify responsibility with respect to property as core.
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... BUT PERIPHERAL PROBLEMS
Beyond this core there are peripheral, and more problematic, aspects of stewardship. These divide into (i) baseline issues (what is the benchmark for stewardship?); (ii) whether stewardship arises from, or can attach to, voluntary actions; and (iii) financial issues, relating to whether compensation for loss of rights, or payment for environmental benefits, is made, and whether this matters.
Baseline issues
It is easier to say that stewardship entails other-regarding behaviour, or to say that a specific legal development evidences stewardship, than it is to say more precisely what stewardship ought to entail. Surprisingly, few have engaged in any depth with this issue in relation to environmental protection, though Rodgers' work is an important exception.
3 1 Rodgers has recently written about the challenges in using regulatory law to define property rights, drawing on examples in relation to agri-environmental and nature conservation law. As he notes, many of the regulatory laws which operate in this area provide only for transient obligations, often by agreement and in practice often subject to fluctuations in agricultural market prices which influence the extent to which such schemes are taken up, and hence provide a problematic basis on which to argue for a fundamental reordering of property rights. Rodgers' preferred solution is to distil baselines from these -such as 'good agricultural practice' -which then form a minimum environmental-regarding duty in property law. 32 In earlier work, however, Rodgers explores 33 National experience in relation to water pollution, for example, shows some of the problems of using a 'good practice' standard in relation to the water environment, with good practice being removed as a straight defence to a water pollution charge. 34 And, of course, any baseline with respect to water abstraction could not be based on agricultural practice but would need to be more general -a general environmental land use standard.
Is non-voluntary, in rem action essential?
It is notable that the national agri-environmental schemes under which landowners are, through voluntarily entered into agreements, paid to provide certain kinds of environmental benefits -in effect, payment for ecosystem services -are known as 'Environmental Stewardship' schemes. 35 Although this can be discounted as just a similarity of terminology, for Gray and Gray, these schemes are evidence of the shift towards conceiving of property as stewardship, based on notions of civic obligation.
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There are, however, two particular sticking points with this kind of example of stewardship. First, it is not clear how a voluntarily entered into economic incentive scheme can illustrate 'stewardship' as this is understood as a duty-imposing concept. Second, the example of the 'Environmental Stewardship' scheme is problematic because it is essentially a personal rather than a property-based matter; payments are made to those with a broad range of interests in land, including licences (meaning that land managers are eligible to receive payments directly, not just owners), and agreements do not run with the land. That said, it must be recognised that the notion of stewardship, and stewardship in practice, cannot be limited only to obligations compelled by law. This is because even a stewardship approach to property entails both fights and responsibilities, as well as ethical rather than simply legal duties.
Financial issues
There is an increasing use of economic mechanisms to deliver environmental policy goals, including the 'payment for ecosystem services' agenda. Typically this approach emphasises both the value of paying for the provision of public, ecological benefits, and the primacy of the land manager as ecological custodian. This approach emphasises that income may be foregone 37 and public benefits generated which the public should pay for. Equally, arguments in favour of stewardship in property law generally include arguments against financial compensation for loss of 'rights', either because the right to determine how land is used must necessarily be already restricted in the wider public interest or, in the case of statutory developments, the legislative reform signals the social, attitudinal shift which justified the rebalancing in the first place.
This issue is most strongly felt through the 'regulatory takings' debate. The issue is more keenly disputed in other jurisdictions, 38 but the property protections in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 39 as well as in the common law, 40 are relevant and may, where regulation exceeds the state's margin of appreciation, be manifestly unreasonable, place a disproportionate burden on individuals and fail to strike a fair balance (compensation being an important aspect of whether a fair balance has been struck between the state and the individual 41 ), and act to limit regulatory reform. Given the essentially supervisory role of the ECHR regime, however, the threshold for a successful claim is very high.
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Whether compensation is required will depend on the nature of the interference with the property entitlement and the wider circumstances. For Tarlock, water rights, being typically relational rather than absolute, are less likely to engage takings claims.
4 3 This is probably the preferable view only on a narrow doctrinal reading; if looked at more broadly, as Freyfogle has done, we are more likely to see similarities between water rights and other property rights rather than differences, 44 though even Freyfogle suggests that the relational, community-oriented nature of water rights may be in advance of the general state of property rights. 45 In terms of water rights, however, the issue is muddied by the fact that, if the right to abstract is removed, the associated property right essentially goes. The position is not, then, similar to regulation of other land uses, such as certain controls on land development, where it can be argued that while a specific land use may be prohibited or controlled, beyond this the right to determine use of the land is generally not removed. 46 This shows up some of the limitations of riparian rights, detached as they are from a tangible 'thing' over which property is exercised.
A final point on financial issues relates to payment for environmental benefits. One function that a stewardship approach facilitates is in providing a land management reference level. In principle, actions which fall beneath this standard should be subject to the polluter pays principle, with costs being internalised, whereas actions above this level may justify a 'pay the provider' approach. This is an attractive, and seemingly principled, distinction. In practice, however, it is subject to the same baseline problems identified above.
STEWARDSHIP AS A PROPERTY AND AS A POLICY TERM
Putting to one side the ethical question of whether it is right to pay people to do good, the three factors just mentioned seem, at the very least, to muddy the waters of the stewardship concept. They are, perhaps, not so peripheral to the stewardship debate but, actually, rather central to our understanding of stewardship as a concept.
One way to help understand these points is to set up two distinct, though related, models of stewardship. On the one hand there is stewardship as a model in property law, and on the other there is stewardship as a policy approach. Making for better stewardship of natural resources can be approached through either route. For example, property rights can be recalibrated by, amongst other things, legislative or judicial realignments, or land can otherwise be subject to techniques to encourage certain land management practices. The former more clearly engages stewardship as a property concept; the latter is more in line with stewardship as a policy approach. Under the policy approach, whether, for example, money is paid out is essentially a policy question, to be decided on the basis of whether doing so would be necessary to influence behaviour and would be good, effective public policy, although this cannot be approached without regard to prevailing social attitudes. Similarly, a voluntary approach can be justified as good policy because of the principle in favour of liberty, and because it is likely to be less of a regulatory burden, but a more mandatory, prescriptive approach may be justified if voluntarism is not effective.
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In practice, there is likely to be significant cross-over between these approaches. For instance, cost internalising and paying for positive ecosystem services approaches interrelate because of the difficulties of neatly distinguishing negative and positive externalities. 48 Of course, neither formal, doctrinal changes to the law nor policy or regulatory reforms occur in a vacuum; both are also propelled by societal, cultural or political shifts. 49 The broader point is that property rights and regulatory rules co-exist and mutually influence each other. What we have, therefore, is both an internal (property) and external (regulatory) dimension to stewardship, though the two are intertwined. On the one hand, the stewardship approach to property seems to provide a certain justification for a provision such as that contained in section 27 of the Water Act 2003, which both restricts property rights and regulatory entitlements in order to prevent serious ecological damage. On the other hand, however, the concept of stewardship is a problematic reference level for determining whether to make the abstractor internalise the cost of the environmental harm it causes or whether to take a 'pay the provider' approach towards public environmental benefits; nor does it determine whether voluntary actions 'count' in terms of stewardship, or address the baseline issue.
PROGRESSING ABSTRACTION CONTROLS
In England and Wales, statutory controls on water abstraction were first introduced in 1965 under the Water Resources Act 1963 and the law is now contained in Part II of the Water Resources Act 1991, which sets out the basic framework of regulatory controls over abstraction and impounding. In essence Part II provides (with some exceptions) that all but relatively minimal abstractions of surface or groundwaters must be done under a licence from what is now the Environment Agency or Natural Resources Wales, which are under general conservation, recreational and supply-related duties. 5 1 Ever since the 1963 Act, however, existing abstractors have been treated generously, being given permanent licences -'licences of right' -based on their prior use, on a first come first served basis. Successive enactments modified the rules on water resources -partly to reflect changing awareness of environmental impacts, partly to give effect to EU obligations and partly to reflect increasing demands on water resources 5 2 -but without destabilising 'licences of right'.
THE COMMON LAW BACKGROUND
Administrative regulation, then, is now central and it is an offence to breach the terms of a licence or abstract more than minimal quantities without a licence.
5 3 However, regulation has not formally removed the underlying common law rights, so in principle, as a civil matter between riparian owners, common law rights and duties still apply. 54 Underlying riparian rights, being property law rights, may also engage human rights protections in relation to property. So it is important to outline briefly the common law of water rights.
As a matter of the law on riparian rights, a riparian proprietor is entitled to the 'ordinary' use of the water flowing in the watercourse; this encompasses the reasonable use of water for domestic purposes and for the purposes of watering livestock, even where this interferes with use by a downstream proprietor.
5 5 Beyond these ordinary uses, a riparian owner may take water for an 'extraordinary' or 'secondary' use but only to the extent that this does not interfere with the rights of other proprietors above or below. However, the use must be reasonable, the purpose for which it is taken must be connected with the abstractor's tenement and the water must be restored to the watercourse substantially undiminished in volume and unaltered in character. 56 The reasonable use approach did not extend to groundwaters in part because it was considered too difficult to quantify the right because the flow could not be seen.
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In relation to surface waters the reasonable use approach was authoritatively settled in Embrey v Owen, 5 8 but can be traced back to the landmark decision of the Kings Bench in Mason v Hill. 59 This approach -in contrast to a first in time or prior appropriation approach, which had earlier found favour -gave to the courts a greater degree of discretion to strike the balance between competing users of water as a matter of correlative proportionality. At a practical level, this seemed to mean that an existing use would not be required in order to defend one's riparian right, but any claim for damages would require a material and unreasonable invasion of an existing use, the right in effect being split between the usufructuary right to take water, and the right to protect a reasonable taking. This position was authoritatively laid down in Embrey, which stressed the extent to which decisions would be matters of degree, so that 'water law ... was left in a state inviting intuitive, ad hoc decision-making.
6 0 It is striking, therefore, that while the common law moved away from prior appropriation, administrative regulation effectively adopted this approach.
REGULATORY REFORM
Returning to administrative regulation, the Water Act 2003 made some important changes to the law on water resources. These were motivated partly by national concerns and partly by the need to implement the EU Water Framework Directive In marking a step towards taking a more comprehensive and more holistic approach to water law and policy, the Water Framework Directive requires water quantity to be regulated and not merely water quality, so that it contributes to 'the provision of the sufficient supply of good quality surface water and groundwater as needed for sustainable, balanced and equitable water use'. 6 1 More specifically, Article 11 of the Directive requires that, for each river basin, there is a programme of measures addressing various water management issues, including abstraction. Under Article 11(3)(e), each programme of measures must include 'controls over the abstraction of fresh surface water and groundwater, and impoundment of fresh surface water, including a register or registers of water abstractions and a requirement of prior authorisation for abstraction and impoundment'. This is necessary to ensure the aim of achieving the quality objectives of the Directive, set out in Article 4 ('good status'). 62 The programme of measures in the river basin plans should have been operational by 22 December 2012. The quality objectives of the Directive are to be achieved by 2015. As a matter of national policy, however, the UK Government terms the 2015 objectives the 'default objectives' of the Directive, but also speaks of the Directive's 'alternative objectives', 63 but it is notable that in England and Wales at least, the Environment Agency is advised that it 'should make full use of the alternative objectives. They are an integral part of the [Directive's] objectives and their use should be a normal part of river basin planning'. It is clear that, in practice, implementation is proceeding on the basis of three compliance periods (to 2015, and then for the purposes of 'phased achievement' of the quality objectives, if certain conditions apply, 2015-2021 and 2021-2027), which broadly map on to the schedule of the periodic reviews for the water and sewerage companies. Moreover, there is ambiguity over whether the objective of 'aiming' to achieve good status denotes an obligation of results or of best efforts. The European Commission is not bringing infringement proceedings against states which have implemented the Directive as an obligation of best efforts, though it has been argued that the better interpretation is that the objective is one of results (albeit that even an objective of result is not absolute). 64 Article 11(3)(e) also requires that: 'These controls shall be periodically reviewed and, where necessary, updated.' Hence, partly to assist in the implementation of the Directive, the Water Act 2003 requires all new abstraction licences to be time limited. However, existing licences of right were unaffected in the sense that they did not become time limited. The intention of government had been that some form of incentive mechanism should be used to encourage licence holders voluntarily to switch from permanent to time-limited licences, though the message was at best mixed -'Government remains of the view that truly responsible abstractors should have little need of persuasion that voluntary conversion to time-limited licences is an essential ingredient of their environmental credentials' 65 -had disappeared by 200166 and was formally rejected in 2008. 67 This seems a rather good example of the ambiguities of stewardship: a lack of clarity both about what the obligation entails and who bears any burden (and also brings into question whether this part of the Directive has been correctly implemented).
In England and Wales it is estimated that about 4 per cent of rivers are failing to support the Water Framework Directive's good ecological status as a result of pressures from overabstraction. 68 Abstraction charging divides into application charges and advertising administration charges (fixed charges) and annual charges (made up of standard charges and compensation charges). Under the standard charge, the Environment Agency or Natural Resources Wales recovers its costs of managing water abstractions and regulating abstractions, proportional to the impact of that licence on water resources; the compensation charge adds an amount to the standard charge for the recovery of compensation costs associated with the revocation or variation of licences. Annual charges are calculated from factors which take into account the volume of the licensed abstraction (not the actual volume abstracted), and the source, season, and degree of expected water loss, together with a standard unit charge (SUC) for the applicable region and an environmental improvement unit charge (EUIC).
The EUIC is, in principle, to recover the costs of compensation payments paid under the Environment Agency's Restoring Sustainable Abstraction (RSA) programme, which provides a mechanism for licences to be removed where an abstraction is causing environmental damage. RSA is a non-statutory process and applies to sites designated under the EU's nature conservation Directives 73 of consents' process to be completed before the non-compensatory section 27 regime became effective.)
The basic idea, then, is that charging is used to incentivise behavioural change towards more efficient and less environmentally harmful water use. In practice, however, this does not seem to be happening, because the EIUC has not accumulated sufficient funds. Only a very small number of licences -out of around 20,00075 -have been reformed on a compulsory basis since the Restoring Sustainable Abstraction programme was introduced in 1999. The process has essentially stalled 76 and has been described as 'clearly unsatisfactory and ... causing ongoing and severe damage to the environment'. For the future, the current Water Bill envisages that the price review process, under which the privatised water and sewerage companies' prices and investment decisions are determined for five-year periods, will be used to fund sustainable abstraction schemes. To help drive this, water companies will not be compensated for withdrawal or variation of licences, in effect applying the thinking behind section 27 to all water company abstractions. In parallel, non-legislative initiatives sich as OFWAT's voluntary Abstraction Incentive Mechanism 7 8 will be rolled out. The longer term may see more general reform of abstraction licensing.
SECTION 27 OF THE WATER ACT 2003
Section 27 removes the right to compensation where an abstraction licence, which was granted before 1 April 2006 and which is not time limited, is varied or revoked, as directed by the Secretary of State or Welsh Ministers on or after 15 July 2012, to protect the water environment (as broadly defined) from serious damage. An amendment to apply this provision to time-limited licences as well was rejected as it was thought that it would remove an incentive for licence holders to convert to time-limited licences. 79 Although section 27 only refers to the role of the Secretary of State, in reality section 27 is the end point of a process that begins with a search for voluntary licence change, and cases will only be referred to the Secretary of State if the licence holder formally objects to a compulsory licence change. payment of compensation to those who cause damage to the environment is clearly inconsistent with the polluter pays principle, and this measure seeks to remove that inconsistency. 8 ' Section 27 does not define 'serious damage', prompting concerns about legal uncertainty. 82 Interpretive guidance, which indicates that the term includes potential or risk of serious damage, uses three principles under which the qualitative nature of the damage, the extent and magnitude of the damage, and whether the damage is reversible and how long recovery may take, are to be established. All three principles are to be considered 'and the weight of evidence across all three must be used to determine the final conclusion. It may not be necessary for all three to be assessed individually as not serious to conclude that there is not serious damage. Similarly, it is not necessary for all three to be assessed as serious for it to be classified as serious damage'. The final decision 'will be determined on a case by case basis taking into account the weight of evidence across all three principles' 83 and illustrative examples are given.
In some respects, this is a process akin to the interpretation of similarly subjective environmental law concepts such as 'significance', 84 'significant harm' 85 or 'significant adverse effects'. 86 Such terms often raise difficulties because of differences of opinion over whether they connote harm (or potential harm) which is more than trivial (i.e. not insignificant), or whether a greater level of harm is indicated; the same term -such as 'significant' -may mean different things depending on, for example, whether it is a trigger for heightened scrutiny in decision-making (as in environmental impact assessment) or a threshold for substantive limitations on, or liabilities in relation to, land use (as with contaminated land). Concepts such as these also raise the problem of how much they are matters of law or a matter of decision-maker discretion. 87 They also raise empirical issues -how do they operate in practice? In principle, the contaminated land provisions impose liability rules on those who cause contamination which leads to 'significant harm'. In practice, they act as market signals and influence development control decisions. 88 So their impact on property rights is somewhat different from what might have been envisaged. A finding of 'significant environmental effects' under the Directive on environmental impact assessment triggers procedural, rather than substantive, consequences.
The point at which, e.g., significance or seriousness is to be determined -is this having regard to mitigation measures or not? -also matters. Where an abstraction licence appears to be causing serious environmental damage the Environment Agency's Operational Instruction is clear that the matter has to proceed on the basis of investigation of options to mitigate the problem:
Before reaching a decision on the need for a licence change, you must carry out detailed investigations and consider possible options to balance the needs of the environment and water users. If investigations show that a licence needs to be changed, you should talk to the licence holder about this change, discuss possible alternative options and explore the best way for this to happen. Where there is an abstraction issue, you need to decide whether this represents serious damage.
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Cases will proceed, then, by trying to negotiate a voluntary variation (and in an extreme case, revocation) to the licence (which would not entail compensation), and only if this is not successful to look to use section 27. Guidance suggests that discretion may be needed as a matter of deciding relative priorities.
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SECTION 27 AND STEWARDSHIP
What might section 27 have to say about water rights and stewardship? Since it has yet to be used, 9 1 there are obviously certain limits to any analysis. Nevertheless, although in a sense they are all regulatory in nature and hence related, there are specific interpretive, and wider regulatory and economic, factors surrounding this provision which can inform such an analysis.
INTERPRETIVE FACTORS
First, whether section 27 is used is ultimately dependent upon the Secretary of State being 'satisfied' that this is 'necessary'. This form of wording is clearly less qualified than some environmental remediation provisions, 92 but it is also somewhat less than an automatic public law duty, which could have been cast as requiring, if serious damage is occurring, variation or revocation to prevent such damage. 93 Part of the intention, as evidenced by guidance, is to allow the Environment Agency or Natural Resources Wales discretion to use the threat of section 27 to reach a negotiated solution with abstractors before the matter is referred to the Secretary of State, but equally the Secretary of State also has some degree of discretion in deciding whether to serve a direction to the Agency or Natural Resources Wales to vary or revoke because he or she could be satisfied that ongoing negotiations meant that it was not 'necessary' to serve. Second, there is vagueness about whether the use of section 27 should be driven by Water Framework Directive implementation. As noted, the 2012 deadline speaks of implementing Article 11(3)(e) of the Directive concerning abstraction by the deadline for programmes of measures to be operative, but the 2003 Act is wholly silent about the Directive. Although section 27 could, it seems, be used either to give effect to the Directive or just for national reasons, the lack of clarity, both of section 27 and the guidance, further complicates matters. 89 See Environment Agency, above n. 80 at 3. The implication is that voluntary changes would be pursued to begin with. 90 Ibid. ('Licence changes that meet the criteria of serious damage must be prioritised to deliver environmental benefits to the most damaged, or at risk, sites quickly. Aside from the elimination of priority and priority hazardous substances, where specific rules apply, the general quality objectives of the Directive, and the dates by which these are to be achieved, create a considerable degree of interpretive uncertainty. This may not, in practice, be a barrier to creating innovative forms of stakeholder participation at catchment level and indeed may actually encourage it. But the position may differ when the Directive is used to target specific, rather than general, problems. In this situation, the Directive becomes more akin to command regulation. But the vagueness of the Directive's objectives may in practice limit its application, because of the discretion not to find that, for the purposes of the Directive, there is 'serious damage' (the negative concept of damage not fitting well with the positive concept of good status).
REGULATORY FACTORS
A number of regulatory factors shed light on section 27 from a stewardship perspective.
First, it was noted that the main regulatory forcing function was to incentivise holders of licences of right to convert to time-limited licences, for which the nine years between enactment of the Water Act 2003 and the coming into force of section 27 would seem ample time. But there is no evidence that this has occurred. 94 Nor is there evidence that section 27 has driven behavioural change in abstractors who might be likely to be caught by its provisions. Notably, the consultation on the implementation of section 27 only opened in February 2012 and closed on 3 May 2012, two months before the provision became operative, whilst the government response and the Environment Agency's Operational Instruction were published in November 2012 -after the section was in force. None of this indicates any official view that providing potentially affected abstractors with more specific guidance on how 'serious damage' would be interpreted for the purposes of section 27 would force behavioural change in the intervening period. The extent to which section 27 will result in what might be termed reflexive recalibration of property rights -by encouraging mitigation action so that its provisions cannot be applied -might also be questioned.
A second regulatory issue concerns shifts in the nature of regulation itself. The relationship between rights (and, for present purposes, also responsibilities) and regulation, however, is also complicated by the distinction between regulation as providing certainty for property and for market transactions 95 and regulation pursuing non-market objectives such as ecological enhancement, aims which can be pursued simultaneously but whose simultaneous pursuit, in practice, often tends to prioritise legal certainty. In other words, when we assess a measure for its 'stewardshipness' we need to ask whether the measure really advances community-owed obligations or, and to what extent, it pursues marketstabilising, property-protecting, objectives. Much of the wider context, it is suggested, emphasises the latter more than the former. Some, for example, argue that state engineered water markets advance community obligations by trying to provide stability to commercial water transfer. A third regulatory issue relates to human rights law. There is no evidence that the lengthy time period in section 27 becoming operative was motivated by human rights concerns but nor is it an irrelevant factor in terms of striking the fair balance needed under the Convention. It is likely that it would have been in the minds of the legislator because both the seriousness of any losses and the absence of compensation are factors in determining whether a fair balance has been struck, and because of the nature of water rights. As noted, both revocation and variation of a water abstraction licence are more towards the taking end of the spectrum of interference rather than the regulation end because, even if the right is curtailed (varied), it is not as if the right-holder can do anything else with the subject of the right. A variation can be seen as effectively a partial taking, not a limited restriction, which may make the absence of compensation more of a problem in terms of the striking of a fair balance. However, returning to the common law position, the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary use is relevant. As long as the licence is varied down to ordinary use -the unqualified aspect of the right -then there is not likely to be a human rights breach. Variation of an extraordinary use right -and the sorts of cases where section 27 might apply will almost invariably involve such uses -will not require compensation as part of the fair balance test. This links to a further point: that part of the licence which would be varied would be reallocated to the state while the part that had not would remain, in a sense, private property. This illustrates some of the difficulties of drawing any sharp distinction between public and private property and is perhaps illustrative of Gray's notion of 'quasi-public property' which revolves around the notion of private property circumscribed by specific public responsibilities . 97 The broader point, however, is that human rights factors, whilst never as restrictive of regulation as many fear (or some, in relation to section 27, might like 98 ), nevertheless influence the context within which property rights are redrawn.
A final regulatory factor relates to the scientific basis for variation or revocation. While progress has been made under the review of consents process, the knowledge base is greater in relation to such sites. More generally, however, there are acknowledged to be significant limitations in knowledge over the impact of flows on ecology, and both resort to modelling. 99 Modelling may be an appropriate tool to inform general catchment management but is likely to be less robust as a justification for removing rights without compensation. Such information-deficit problems, as evidenced by the Restoring Sustainable Abstraction programme, again serve to limit the likely practical impact of section 27, at least in the short to medium term.
ECONOMIC FACTORS
Some of the points made above in relation to regulation clearly engage economic issues; for example, human rights claims are likely to be about uncompensated economic interests. Beyond this, further economic issues arise. During the transition period (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , both the 'review of consents' process and the Restoring Sustainable Abstraction programme have been ongoing. The latter has not been especially effective because of serious weaknesses in the funding mechanism devised. But the former has seen compensation paid out where designated sites are affected. Both processes, then, have involved compensation for the withdrawal of rights, and the time frames have, to say the least, been advantageous to abstractors holding 'licences of right'. Hence, many instances of 'serious damage' will have been addressed through the payment of compensation before section 27 came into force or, in the case of water companies, dealt with as voluntary changes under section 51 Water Resources Act 1991. The extent to which problematic abstraction rights are likely to have been addressed voluntarily, through compensation, makes it more difficult to argue that the reform in section 27 is evidence in practice of a strong shift towards stewardship.
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
As a matter of common law, water abstraction is subject to broadly formulated rules of reasonable use aimed at protecting the interests of other potentially affected riparian owners (though not environmental interests if these are not indirectly advanced by private rights). Above minimal levels, however, water abstraction is subject to regulatory controls, though these often undermine riparian rights, bestowing generous regulatory entitlements to existing abstractors essentially aimed at administrative rationing rather than addressing serious environmental harm. So abstraction is subject to responsibilities albeit that these are, in the case of environmental harm, often weakly formulated.
Section 27 of the Water Act 2003, then, is notable for the inroads that it seems intended to make on this broadly liberal legal framework. On its face, it seems to embody a strong, and relatively less contentious, stewardship approach, limiting private rights in a water law context in order to advance important public interests. But it is important to drill down into specific legal provisions, and the context within which they have been enacted and implemented, to assess more fully whether such an assessment is justified.
What the analysis reveals is a complex picture involving a confluence of factors at work, many of which engage the fuzzier aspects of stewardship as a concept. Addressing serious environmental harm may seem to overcome the difficulty of the uncertain baseline, but even this may pose problems because of information deficits, the subjectivity of the standard and the legislative context (including the Water Framework Directive context) within which it sits. While the obligation is binding and not voluntary, the wider context is one where voluntary change is preferred and the legal trigger for the action -whether the Secretary of State is 'satisfied' -could have been more strongly formulated. And while the loss of the right is uncompensated, the review of consents process will have compensated many riparian owners during the period before section 27 came into force, and the regulatory aim, although it ultimately failed to deliver, was clearly to use compensatory financial mechanisms more generally during this intervening period. Taken together, these factors serve to limit section 27 in terms of its scope as an example of the recalibration or reshuffling of water rights from liberal to stewardship approaches. However, it would be wrong to give the impression that section 27 somehow advances a liberal model of property. The example indicates some of the complex ways in which private rights and public interests interact formally and in practice. The private right to abstract water without regard for serious environmental consequences is now subject to legislative control, and this in itself is a significant step in the direction of stewardship. But what if we pose the issue from a different angle and ask: 'Is the abstractor who causes serious environmental harm now subject to environmental stewardship responsibility?' It is suggested that if this were asked today the answer to this might not, for the reasons set out, be so embracing of stewardship.
Of course, section 27 might be re-examined in 10 years' time and found not to have been used directly or to have been used extensively. A different analysis might then need to be written. And water rights law may, in the future, orientate more towards stewardship through, for example, greater reform of abstraction licensing. The present analysis, however, is offered as a counterweight to the uncritical use of doctrinal examples to advance or negate stewardship as an orientating property law concept.
Environmental regulation, like any laws, may, of course, perform an expressive function, advancing social or political views or aspirations, without seeking directly to regulate behaviour or regardless of its enforceability or its actual behavioural impact.1 0 0 Notwithstanding the limitations mentioned above, then, section 27 might be said to perform such an expressive function -sending out the message that it is no longer appropriate to invoke water rights without regard to serious environmental consequences. But we should be a little circumspect before utilising a provision like this to advance claims about stewardship obligations in respect of water rights.
